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PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY AND MACROECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE: ARE VOTERS REALLY SO NAIVE?
Henry W. Chappell, Jr.*

F

OLLOWINGthe pioneeringwork of Kramer than one who simply extrapolates. If votes and

(1971), numerous studies have analyzed the
relationships between the macroeconomic performance of political administrations and their popularity or vote-getting ability. Kramer's work
showed that the aggregate congressional vote for
an incumbent party can be explained rather well
by variables indicating recent economic performance. Subsequent works have extended Kramer's
research by explaining presidential vote or Gallup
Poll popularity data with similar models.'
On one point almost all of these studies agree:2
votes and popularity can be explained well by
models which suppose that voters judge policymakers on the basis of retrospective evaluation of
past macroeconomic outcomes. Most authors interpret their results as being supportive of the
hypothesis of "rational" voters, since the evidence
indicates that voting decisions are not based purely
upon personalities, party affiliation, or chance.
Kramer argued that if voters regard past macroeconomic performance of an administration to be
indicative of future performance, then a concern
with past performance indicates a concern for
future performance. Voters who simply extrapolate from the past to predict the future are rather
naive, however. A "sophisticated" voter, who has
an understanding of the important intertemporal
constraints embodied in the structure of the economy, would be able to forecast future consequences of current policy choices more accurately
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' Fair (1978a), Bloom and Price (1975), Arcelus and Meltzer
(1975), and Pollard (1981 a, 1981b) have all estimated models to
explain voting, while Frey and Schneider (1978) and Hibbs
(I 982a, 1982b) have developed models to explain presidential
popularity.
2
An exception is provided by Arcelus and Meltzer (1975).

popularity are simply functions of past outcomes,
then voters must either be ignorant of the basic
structure of the economy, or unconcerned with the
future.
The supposition that voters are so naive might
run counter to the intuition of most economists,
who generally assume individual rationality as a
central behavioral postulate. Nevertheless, the empirical results noted above have been accepted by
many as evidence that voters do misperceive their
own long-run interest. The implications of the
naive voter hypothesis for macroeconomic policymaking are disturbing. Nordhaus (1975) has developed a model which shows that voter naivete
can encourage vote maximizing politicians to induce political business cycles and an inflationary
bias. There is some, but not unanimous, empirical
support for the existence of politically motivated
business cycles, and casual empiricism also suggests that politicians themselves believe in the naive
voter.3
While studies show that empirical evidence is
consistent with the notion that voters are concerned with the recent past, the results do not
reject a "sophisticated" voter hypothesis. None of
the aforementioned studies has tested a model
consistent with a sophisticated voter hypothesis,
i.e., a model in which voters understand what
outcomes are feasible in the long and short runs,
and are concerned with future as well as current
and past economic performance. In this paper we
develop such a model and estimate it using Gallup
Poll data on presidential popularity. Results of
this model are compared to results from a "naive"
voter model similar to those employed in previous
research.

3Nordhaus (1975) and Tufte (1978) have provided evidence
of political business cycles for a number of Western democracies, and Frey and Schneider (1978) and Maloney and Smirlock
(1981) have estimated policy "reaction" functions suggesting
that the timing of elections affects policymaking. See Tufte for
a discussion of casual empirical evidence indicating that politicians believe that current economic conditions affect electoral
outcomes.
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MacRae (1977, 1981) provides the only past
research which has attempted to assess whether the
electorate is best characterized as naive or sophisticated. His procedure provides only an indirect
test, however. MacRae assumes that political administrations choose policies which maximize a
vote function. He then determines whether actual
policy choices more closely resemble the solution
to a vote maximization problem in which voters
are assumed to be naive or one in which they are
assumed to be sophisticated. MacRae found that
the sophisticated voter hypothesis performed as
well or better than the naive voter hypothesis in a
variety of time periods. If political administrations
do not actually choose policies which maximize a
vote function, then it is not clear what implications MacRae's results have regarding the question
of voter sophistication. The fact that presidents
fail to induce the political business cycles which
would maximize votes under the naive voter hypothesis could mean that voters are not naive, or it
could mean that the president does not implement
those policies which would maximize votes. MacRae's results are important in that they show that
political business cycles may be of limited consequence, but a direct test may shed more light on
the question of whether voters are sophisticated or
naive.

be developed. Fair proposed a measure of economic performance for an administration based
on the difference between the level of welfare
which would result over an extended time period
given the actual policy choices made by the administration, and the level which would have resulted
if optimal policies had been chosen.
To test the sophisticated voter hypothesis we
could compute a measure similar to that proposed
by Fair and use it as an independent variable in an
equation to explain presidential popularity. But
doing so would require us to develop and estimate
a macroeconometric model and to solve a large
number of optimal control problems. Determining
appropriate parameter values for the objective
function characterizing preferences for output
versus price stability would compound the computational task. Although such an undertaking might
be feasible if the model of the economy were quite
simple, we have chosen to employ a less cumbersome procedure in developing our popularity
model. It is convenient to begin by discussing the
model of the economy underlying our analysis.
We assume that the structure of the economy
can be approximated by an accelerationist Phillips
curve embodied in the following equations:4
N

Pt =,miPt

-i + f (Zt) + et, f (Zt) >

?

(1)

i= 1

l.

Measuring Economic Performance

Conventional popularity models have assumed
that voters look at past inflation rates, unemployment rates, and perhaps growth of output in
evaluating an administration's performance. Fair
(1978b) has suggested that a more reasonable performance measure, one which would be embraced
by sophisticated voters concerned with current and
future welfare, would consider what combinations
of unemployment and inflation were actually feasible in various periods, and would consider the
likely future consequences of policies currently in
effect. Fair noted that "optimal" policies could be
found by solving a series of complex control problems. Given that "welfare" can be expressed as a
specific function of current and future macroeconomic outcomes, and given a system of equations
modelling the structure of the economy, one could
determine welfare maximizing trajectories for
policy instruments. Each quarter, with new information available, new optimal policy plans could

N

Lmi=

1

(2)

where
-I
the actual rate of output in period t
QNt = the "6natural"rate of output in period t
Pt= inflation in period t
et= a random error term.
Zt =Qt/QNt

Qt=

This model implies that there exists a short-run
tradeoff between the rate of inflation and output
(hence unemployment), but no tradeoff in the long
4 Although the model presented in equations (1) and (2) is
usually derived under the assumption of "adaptive" inflationary expectations, it may also approximate an economy in which
individuals have "rational" expectations, but one in which
policy actions are not always fully anticipated or markets do
not instantaneously adjust to equilibrium (see Fischer (1977)).
We assume that policymakers can influence real economic
variables, without ruling out the possibility of rational expectations.
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run. Essentially the equations assume that shortFaced with severe current inflation, sophistirun Phillips curves are negatively sloped, but that cated voters would prefer to see the government
the long-run Phillips curve is vertical.' If the in- pursue contractionary policies (i.e., make Zt less
cumbent administration adjusts monetary and fis- than 1) in order to gradually move down the
cal policies so that actual output, Q, is kept above long-run Phillips curve. In general, the higher the
its natural rate, QN (correspondingly, if unem- current rate of inflation, the more severe the conployment is kept below its natural rate), then tractionary policy should be. Similarly, deflation
accelerating inflation will eventually result. If Q is should be countered with stimulative policies. As
kept below QN (correspondingly, if unemploy- an approximation, we assume that the optimal
ment is kept above its natural rate) the inflation value of the control variable Zf, denoted Z7, is
rate will eventually decline. When Q is held equal determined according to the following linear
to QN, any inflation rate may persist indefinitely.
feedback rule:
While conventional popularity functions assume
(3)
Z,= d + d P ,
do 0O, d < O?
that voters simply punish inflation and reward
output or low unemployment, voters who under- where the slope parameter d, will be larger in
stand the long- and short-run relationships noted absolute value the greater the aversion of voters to
above would evaluate policymakers differently. inflation relative to recession. The linear relationInflation in a given period is largely determined by ship specified in (3) should provide a reasonable
past expectations of inflation, which cannot easily approximation for the optimal Zt which could be
be controlled by current policy choices. Expected computed as the solution to a control problem like
inflation may be the result of mistakes made by those proposed by Fair (1978b) and MacRae
past policymakers, and sophisticated voters will (1977). In fact, for the particular model and obnot punish the current administration for the mis- jective function employed by MacRae (1977), the
takes of predecessors. Sophisticated voters might optimal level of excess supply is simply a linear
also refrain from rewarding higher values of Q, function of the inflation rate in the preceding
since values of Q greater than QN eventually result period (equation (15), p. 247).
An interesting special case arises when the interin accelerating inflation. In short, sophisticated
voters recognize that short-run policy choices are cept, do, is equal to zero. In this case, starting
constrained to points on a short-run Phillips curve, from zero inflation, voters find that the benefits of
and they will reward or punish according to temporarily increasing output above its natural
whether the chosen point promotes movement to- rate are exceeded by the welfare costs of the
resulting permanent inflation. Voters would thereward desired long-run outcomes.6
fore desire an inflation rate of zero and growth of
Q to match QN in the long run. The arguments of
5Recent estimates, including those of Gordon (1980) and
Feldstein
(1979) suggest that for a growing econMacRae (1981), suggest that the long-run Phillips curve is
nearly vertical; however, our analysis does not crucially depend omy this case is especially compelling,8 and it will
on this assumption.
receive special attention in the following empirical
6 Because equation (1) is stochastic, we should also consider
analysis. In the case where do exceeds zero, voters
whether or not rational voters would reward favorable error
terms. If error terms primarily represent exogenous shocks are willing to accept some permanent inflation in
which are outside the policymaker's control, then there is no
return for a temporary excess of Q over QN, and
reason to reward or punish an incumbent politician for them.
therefore would not wish to move to the horizontal
On the other hand, a president might be able to use policies
besides aggregate demand management to improve the unemployment-inflation tradeoff, so voters might rationally attribute
favorable error terms to the president's actions. We have decided not to include Phillips curve residuals as explanatory
variables for popularity in the sophisticated voter model because: (1) it is likely that error terms resulted largely from
exogenous shocks during the time period studied, and (2) since
we wish to be conservative in accepting the hypothesis of
sophisticated voters, it is preferable to estimate a strong version
of the model. Including Phillips curve residuals as an additional
explanatory variable would blur some of the distinction between the sophisticated voter model and the conventional naive
voter model.

7Gramlich (1979), in a study of optimal responses to price
shocks, also chose to examine linear feedback rules as approximate solutions to optimal control problems.
8 Feldstein assumes that the welfare cost induced by permanent inflation will grow in proportion to the economy. If the
growth rate of the economy exceeds the real social discount
rate, which Feldstein argues is likely, then the present value of
the welfare cost of an increase in permanent inflation above its
target level (which we assume is zero) is infinite, and must
exceed the benefits of the corresponding temporary increase in
output.
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intercept of the long-run Phillips curve. The case
where do is less than zero is implausible, since it
implies that, starting from a zero inflation position, voters would opt for recession and deflation.
To measure economic performance, it is appropriate to judge policymakers on the basis of
how far they deviate from the optimal policy Z,.
In our empirical work, a performance measure
appropriate for sophisticated voters is provided by
= (Zt- do - d1P,1)2.
(4)
St ( Z*)Higher values of St denote poorer performance.
Clearly voters will not always reward increases in
output; if inflation is a serious problem they reward contractionary policies, because they understand its beneficial long-run consequences.

tion of a finite 32 period "memory" is not very
restrictive. The inclusion of the dummy variable
implies that the current administration will be less
popular if its performance is judged to be poor,
but it will be more popular if the performance of
previous administrations was poor.'0 "Honeymoon" effects for an incoming administration may
therefore be either positive or negative, depending
on how the preceding administration fared.
Our estimated popularity functions will make
use of the general formulation of (3) in all cases;
differences in the models involve the selection of
variables to be included in X,. In the naive voter
model the inflation rate P and the output ratio
Q/QN are included as performance measures, so
the equation to be estimated is
31

II. Specification of the Popularity Model

POP,

(ao +

E

alPt-k

+ a2Q-k/QQNt-k)

k=O

We make use of a popularity function which is
similar to that developed by Hibbs (1982a, 1982b).
The general formulation of the popularity function
is provided by (5):
31

E

POP,=

(aO +

AX,

k

)D,t-gk-g

k==O

+bo + BVt+ ut

(5)

where
Xt= a vector of variables indicative of
economic performance
Vt= a vector of noneconomic variables
affecting popularity

Dt t -

k -I

A, B
b0,
g
ao,

=

a dummy variableequal to 1 if the
administration in office in period t
was also in office in period t - k - 1,
and equal to - 1 otherwise9
are vectors of parameters
are scalar parameters.

Equation (5) says that popularity at time t is a
function of economic performance in the 32
quarters extending from the current quarter backwards in time. Presumably the weighting parameter g is between 0 and 1, so that voters weight
recent periods more heavily. Our estimates of g
usually imply that the weight attached to a period
32 quarters back in time is small, so the assump9 Kennedy-Johnson are considered a single administration, as
are Nixon-Ford. This is appropriate since neither succeeding
president drastically altered the economic policies of his predecessor.

XDt,

,k-lgk

+ bo + BVt + ut.

(6)

The conventional hypotheses predict that higher
output will be rewarded and higher inflation
punished. 11
In the sophisticated voter model Xt includes
only the performance measure St defined in (4).
Substituting (4) into (5), the sophisticated voter
model can be written as
POpt=

E

[ao + CO(Zt-k

-do

dlit-k-1)2]

k =O

+ bo + BVt + ut.

(7)
The parameters do and dl, which appear in the
optimal feedback rule, can be estimated along with
the other parameters appearing in the popularity
function.
XDt,t-k_lgk

III. Empirical Results
In all equations, the dependent variable, POPt,
is defined as the fraction of the Gallup Poll respondents who answered "yes" when asked if they
" The specification implies that responsibility for the first
quarter of an incoming administration's tenure is assigned to
the preceding administration. Given the existence of lags in
implementing policies and the fact that the outgoing president
is in office for the first three weeks of the quarter, this is a
reasonable assumption.
1 We have also estimated equations in which Q/QN was
replaced by (1) the ratio of unemployment to the natural rate
of unemployment, (2) the percentage rate of growth of Q, and
(3) the unemployment rate. Results from all of these equations
are very similar, and would not alter any of our conclusions.
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approved of the way the incumbent was handling
his job as president. 2 We assume that poll respondents are representative of the voter population
and that their responses are based upon the same
criteria as voting decisions. The economic variables consist of the quarterly inflation rate (P)
computed from the GNP deflator, real GNP (Q),
and estimates of the natural rate of output (QN)
obtained from a mimeographed supplement to
Gordon (1981). Non-economic variables in the
vector VJinclude dummy variables for each president, to reflect personal attributes which affect
popularity. In addition, 1/TOF (where TOF is the
number of periods the president has been in office)
is included to account for honeymoon effects which
are not interactive with performance. We have
already noted that our specification permits
honeymoon effects related to the performance of
the previous administration, but it is possible that
independent honeymoon effects occur. We also
include variables to account for the effects of
important political events. To proxy dissatisfaction with involvement in the Viet Nam War, we
include KILLED, the number of servicemen killed
in action during the quarter.'3 We also include a
dummy variable for the Watergate period, WG,
which equals one for 19731V through 197411 (i.e.,
from the firing of Archibald Cox until Nixon's
resignation) and is otherwise equal to zero.
Table 1 reports estimates of the popularity functions. We have estimated models corresponding to
the "6naive"voter hypothesis and to our "sophisticated" voter hypothesis, and for each model we
report estimates which respectively assume no
serial correlation and first order serial correlation
of the error terms. All equations are estimated for
the 19571 to 19801V period.'4 The same variables
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appear in the two models; only the form of the
equation differs.
Columns (1) and (4) report nonlinear least
squares estimates of the naive voter model. Under
the assumption of no serial correlation, the estimates indicate that inflation has a significant effect
in lowering popularity; however, the coefficient of
the output variable has a surprising negative sign.
When corrections are made for serial correlation,
the signs remain the same for these two coefficients,
but neither is significant.
Columns (2) and (5) report estimates of the
general version of the sophisticated voter model.'5
These estimates provide little apparent support for
our hypotheses, since both do and d, are incorrectly signed. Collinearity problems provide a possible explanation for the perverse results, however.
In the sample period analyzed, deflation was a
rarity. From the data alone, it may therefore be
difficult to determine whether a preference for
contractionary policies was motivated by a desire
to fight inflation (indicated by a negative dl) or
simply a desire for recession regardless of the
inflation rate (indicated by a negative do). The
estimates suggest the latter.
We have previously noted, however, that a desire for recession when prices are stable is not
sensible, so imposition of the constraint do = 0 is
theoretically justified. Columns (3) and (6) report
estimates of the restricted model, which provide
much stronger support for the sophisticated voter
hypothesis. Estimates of co (indicating how voters
respond to suboptimal performance) and d, (the
inflation aversion parameter) are negative, as hypothesized. Estimates of d, are significant at the
0.05 level in both columns (3) and (6), while the
estimate of co is significant at the 0.05 level in
column (3) and falls just short of significance at
the 0.10 level in column (6). R2s for the restricted
equations differ little from those of their unrestricted counterparts, and are higher than those
obtained for the corresponding naive voter equations, which have an equal number of parameters.

12
Hibbs has noted that POP, is always between 0 and 100%,
and he constrains predicted values of POP, to be in those
bounds by using log(POP,/(l - POP,)) as the dependent variable in his model. Since POP, is always less than 80% and
greater than 20% in our sample, imposing this constraint turns
out to be of little importance. We have also estimated a number
of equations using Hibbs' dependent variable and making
corrections for heteroscedasticity, and all results were quite
similar to those reported here. In the interest of simplicity, we
report only those equations using POP, as the dependent
'5To obtain starting values for the nonlinear least squares
variable.
algorithm, a grid of possible values for do, di, and g was
13Sources: Milstein (1974), U.S. Department of Commerce,
searched. The grid revealed the presence of local, as well as
Bureau of the Census (1980).
global, minima for the sum of squared residuals. Interestingly,
14 Popularity data are unavailable for three observations. Befor the case where do is constrained to equal zero, parameter
cause of these missing values, the procedure to correct for serial values at a local minimum provided almost as good a fit as the
correlation is not strictly appropriate, and estimates should be global minimum reported in the table, but indicated much
regarded as suggestive.
milder inflation aversion.

THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

390

TABLE1.-ESTIMATEDPRESIDENTIAL
POPULARITY
FUNCTIONS
(asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
Corrected for Serial Correlation

Not Corrected for Serial Correlation
Parameter/
Independent Variable

Naive
(1)

bo

0.6820
(19.4040)a
0.1020
(1.5670)
-

aO

CO

Sophisticated
(2)

-

do
-

di
b

b

P
Q/QN
I/TOF
KILLED
WG
KENNEDY
JOHNSON
NIXON
FORD
CARTER
R2
D.W.

-

0.9268
(2.2210)a
- 0.0017
(-2.4408) a
-0.1063
(-1.6532)a
0.0858
(2.0645) a
-0.0409
( 43435)a
-0.1661
(-3.6881)a
-0.0289
(-0.6987)
0.0125
(0.4528)a
- 0.1160
(- 2.8772)a
- 0.0663
(- 1.5098)
-0.2353
( 5.5936)a
0.821
1.18

0.7366
(25.0275)a
- 0.0127
(- 2.2912) a
-18.2171
-(3.5425)a
-0.0140
a
( - ~~2.2516)
0.0024
(2.1345)a
0.8323
(5.0030)a
-

Sophisticated
(3)

Naive
(4)

Sophisticated
(5)

Sophisticated
(6)

0.6549
(16.7755)a
-0.0025
(-0.6139)
-2.4352
(-1.9857)
-

0.6999
(13.6420)a
0.1082
(1.0582)

0.7136
(16.6798)a
- 0.0052
(1.6314)
-10.2100
(- 1.6314)
-0.0201

0.6279
(9.6362)a
-0.0002
(-0.0606)
-2.8662
(-1.5922)
-

0.0036
(1.1763)
0.9207
(1.9575)a
_
-

- 0.0095
(- 3.3196)a
0.9709

-

- 0.0106
(- 3.8972)a
0.9255
(2.7886)a

-

--

-

-

- 0.0590
(-1.1313)
-0.0383
(4. 3699)a
-0.2088
(-5.3877)a
-0.0279
(- 1.0077)
0.0797
(2.2933)a
- 0.1429
(- 4.7842)a
0.0209
(0.4536)
-0.2723
(-8.4383)a
0.845
1.36

0.0948
(2.3213) a
- 0.0360
(-3.9215)a
-0.1446
(-3.3332) (a
-0.0045
(-0.1037)
0.0186
(0.7441)
-0.1114
(_3.1459)a
-0.0516
(- 1.1539)
-0.1994
(-4.8132)a
0.829
1.21

-

-(-1.1789)
-

0.9770
(0.9006)
-0.0012
(- 1.1595)
-0.1121
(-1.1055)
0.0472
(1.0517)
- 0.0172
(1.4061)
-0.0964
1.8016)(a
-0.1044
(- 1.3761)
-0.0067
(-0.1160)
-0.2216
(_3.0495)a
-0.0260
(-0.3348)
-0.3226
(-4.7140)a
0.628
-

0.0015
(0.0301)
-0.0192
(-1.6762)a
-0.1234
2.5063) (a
-0.0743
(- 1.3237)
0.0368
(0.7557)
- 0.2288
(3.7 500)a
- 0.0016
(-0.0266)
-0.3419
(-5.5490)a
0.679
-

(1.7037)a

0.0643
(1.4537)
-0.0190
(-1.6979)a
-0.0928
1.8749)a
-0.0137
(-0.1556)
0.0416
(0.7061)
-0.1637
(-2.5841)a
0.0230
(0.2860)
- 0.2298
(-3.0505)a

0.653
-

aSignificant at the 0. IO level.
b Reported t-statistic is for the test of Ho: g = I

Clearly these results show that the sophisticated
voter hypothesis is consistent with the data, and
performs as well or better than the naive voter
hypothesis.
With dI = -0.0 106, the estimate obtained from
column (3), the model implies that voters would
like to see actual output be 10.6%below the natural rate of output when the inflation rate is 10%.
Translating via Okun's Law, this would imply that
voters desire an unemployment rate about 3.5%
above its natural rate. Although this implies that
voters desire a severe recession when inflation is
high, it cannot be considered a completely unrea-

sonable estimate. 6 The estimate of d1 from column (6) implies slightly weaker aversion to inflation.
The estimate of co from column (3) indicates
that if the actual current Q/QN were to deviate
from the voters' perceived optimal Q/QN by 0.05,
then the resulting popularity rating would be 0.61
percentage points lower than that which would
16 Some officials in the Reagan administration seemed willing
to tolerate unemployment of more than 10% (probably 3% to
4% above the natural rate) to fight inflation in 1982. If administration economic experts are willing to accept such a tradeoff,
rational voters might very well do so also.
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have resulted had optimal policies been chosen. Of
course if the administration consistently deviates
from the optimum by that amount, the cumulative
popularity consequences are much more severe.
After 8 years, the cumulative effect is a popularity
loss of about 7.3 percentage points. Somewhat
larger effects are implied by estimates in column
(6).
Conclusions regarding the noneconomic variables are similar for all six equations. The coefficients of the Watergate and Viet Nam War
variables are negative, as anticipated, and generally significant. The presidential dummies are also
often significant. There is some evidence of
honeymoon effects unrelated to past economic performance, since the coefficient of 1/TOF is sometimes significantly positive. Estimates of the
weighting parameter g range from 0.83 to 0.98,
generally a bit higher than the estimates provided
by Hibbs (1982a).
IV. Evaluating the Performance of Different
Administrations
Using estimates of do and d, and historical data
for Q and QN, we can construct predicted values
of S,, denoted S,, by using the definition provided
by equation (4). By comparing mean values of S,
over different administrations, we can compare the
economic performance of those administrations as
judged by sophisticated voters. Our performance
measure is similar to that proposed by Fair (1978b).
Like that measure, ouis does not punish an administration for inflation caused by predecessors, and
it incorporates a concern for future outcomes.
Unlike Fair's measure, preferences regarding inflation and output are based on empirical evidence
(i.e., the estimate of d,) in our measure. Fair's
performance measures were constructed for two
alternative but arbitrary parameter choices which
indicated relative preferences for output and inflation, and he made use of a large and realistic
model of the economy to provide the constraints
on feasible outcomes.
Table 2 provides mean values of S, calculated
using the estimate of d, obtained from column (3)
of table 1 and setting do equal to zero."7The table
17The results were similar when we used estimates obtained
from equation (6).
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TABLE 2.-ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
OF PRESIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIONS

Administration

Mean S,

Eisenhower I
17.18 x
Eisenhower II
7.38 x
Kennedy-Johnson
4.31x
Johnson
59.39 x
Nixon
38.79 x
Nixon-Ford
43.49 x
Carter
52.47 x

10-4
10-4
10-4
10-4

Rank by
Fair (1 978b)

3
2

2
5
4
3
1
Not ranked
Not ranked

1

10-4
10-4

10 -

Rank based
on Mean S,

4

7
4
5
6

also provides rankings of the administrations, and
compares these rankings with those provided by
Fair (1978b, p. 306). Since our estimates indicate a
rather strong aversion to inflation, we provide
Fair's rankings based on a stronger aversion to
inflation.
The results show that Kennedy-Johnson and
Eisenhower II rank highest in economic performance. In these administrations, mild inflation
was countered with mild slackness in the economy.
The worst performance was provided by the Johnson administration. The macroeconomic stimulus
resulting from Viet Nam War spending is often
pointed to as a source of subsequent inflation, and
this is reflected in our rankings. Carter also gets a
low rating, primarily for failing to impose a sufficiently contractionary stance in the face of rapid
inflation. Fair's rankings differ substantially from
ours. This may result from a stronger aversion to
inflation implicit in our measure, or relatively small
long- and short-run inflationary costs associated
with high levels of output in Fair's model of the
economy.
V.

Conclusions

Our results show that data on Presidential popularity are consistent with the hypothesis that voters
are concerned with the future consequences of
current economic policy choices and are aware of
the nature of constraints imposed by economic
reality. Our sophisticated voter model performs as
well or better than a conventional popularity model
which assumes that voters are myopic or have
limited knowledge of the workings of the economy. Our conclusions are therefore similar to those
of MacRae (1977, 1981), who found a limited
potential for politically motivated business cycles.
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Of course, the results do not prove that the
electorate is "sophisticated." We have not examined all possible specifications for popularity
functions, and we have examined just one set of
data. We have not attempted to account for changing voter preferences over time, for changes in the
structure of the economy, or for differing preferences for various subgroups in the population. In
future work we plan to address some of these
problems and investigate other sources of data
which researchers have employed in studying the
response of the populace to macroeconomic performance. In the meantime, however, we should be
wary of accepting the naive voter hypothesis which
much previous research professes to support.
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